

PEDDLING POVERTY FOR FUNDRAISING: WORLD BANK SWINDLES AMERICAN TAXPAYERS

“The Bank’s main task was fighting poverty, and its very existence depended on its own poverty measures. I think they have some institutional bias towards finding more poverty rather than less.”

[Angus Deaton, Nobel Laureate, Princeton University](#)

“I’ve never in my professional life encountered professional economists who say so many things that are easy to check and turn out not to be true.”

[Paul Romer, Sr. VP and Chief Economist, World Bank](#)

In 2008, the World Bank manipulated the International Comparison Program (ICP) data to swindle American taxpayers of \$2 billion a year over the span of 8 years by inflating the global poverty headcount by 629 million and using it as a rallying cry for international aid.

Part 1 of provides a general background about the World Bank’s culture of fraud. Part 2 presents [a Whistleblower’s \(Yonas Biru’s\) case](#) that was reviewed by the US Departments of State, Treasury and Justice as well as by several members of both Chambers of the US Congress.

American taxpayers have no recourse, as the World Bank is immune from US laws and courts. Instead, it has an internal Administrative Tribunal that is considered a “fig leaf” of justice, presiding over “[internally controlled fictions of due process to defuse complaints](#),” as stated by an international lawyer, Matthew Parish.

As reported by several news outlets, including [Breitbart News](#), Biru’s case “prompted Congress to pass a law stating that the World Bank must introduce external arbitration of disputes in order to continue to get federal funding.” The Obama administration failed to enforce the law.

I. PEDDLING POVERTY FOR FUNDRAISING

1. The World Bank’s Poverty Alleviation Goals and United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals use ICP data to monitor progress towards achieving them. This has made the ICP susceptible to manipulation.

A 2017 opinion piece in [The Hill](#) described the World Bank as “the world’s longest running ‘Go-Fund-Me’ enterprise. Its function is to mobilize resources from rich countries to help fund development programs in poor countries.”

[An independent report](#) found that the ICP data that was published in 2008 shrank China’s and India’s economies by 40% and 36%, respectively. At the snap of a finger, the number of poor people in the world, whose condition calls for immediate relief, was overblown by 629 million, jacking the number up from 571 million to 1.2 billion.

The Bank's high-powered researchers were quick to amplify the data in widely circulated reports with such titles as "The Developing World Is Poorer Than We Thought" ([Chen and Ravallion](#)), and "Even Higher Global Inequality Than Previously Thought" ([Milanovic](#)).

Armed with such reports, World Bank officials pulled at the heartstrings of Western donors. [The US's contribution to Multilateral Development Banks](#) increased from a yearly average of \$2.6 billion for the 4 years before the inflated data was published to a yearly average of \$4.6 billion over 8 years, after the fraudulent global poverty data was published.

Professor Angus Deaton, an eminent member of the ICP Technical Advisory Group (TAG), expressed dismay in an email memo: "I continue to be worried about the long-term impact of the results for India and China, whose consequences will take some time to percolate through... It is simply not feasible to run a world poverty measurement system where hundreds of millions of people who were previously out of poverty are suddenly dumped back in."

2. **Before the 2008 ICP data was published, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) reported a World Bank Staff (Yuri Dikhanov) told them that he can manipulate Asia's data for them.** The following is from a signed testimonial of the ICP regional coordinator for Asia, a former ADB official.

"Mr. Yuri Dikhanov came to Manila more than once to help us in compilation of PPPs [ICP data]. In one of his visits to Manila, Mr. Dikhanov, using AP [Asia and Pacific] data, started demonstrating to me a computer program he had developed that would generate PPPs as per his choice for any country. I immediately asked Mr. Dikhanov to kill the program and not to explore this with AP data again. This incidence was reported to Chief Economist and Assistant Chief Economist subsequently." Read the full testimony [here](#). Read also a [report](#) by the Government Accountability Project (GAP).

3. **Biru expressed serious concern about the global ICP data produced by Dikhanov before the data was published and recommended involving the ICP Technical Advisory Group (TAG).** Eric Swanson (one of the Bank's senior managers) wrote back stating that he will invite TAG's Chair (Professor Alan Heston) to meet with the ICP Team to discuss Biru's concerns. But he refused to involve other TAG members. He wrote: "I don't think it's practical to include other TAG members." He promised the minutes of the meeting between the ICP team and Heston will be sent to "the entire TAG after Shaida has reviewed them." Shaida Badiie was the Director of the Department.
4. Heston made it clear at the meeting that the procedure the World Bank used to fill data gaps was not in keeping with TAG's recommendations. His suggestion was that if the Bank decides to publish the results, it should flag them with three asterisks. Data with one asterisks is considered of questionable quality and users should exercise caution in using it. Two asterisks indicate poor quality and three asterisks mean the data is not fit for research or policy.
5. The Bank ignored Heston's recommendations and published the data. Swanson wrote: "What I heard Alan say is to use three asterisks. I also know that in the old days PWT [University of Pennsylvania's World Table] used to use a, b, and c to grade the quality of the data. I do not know what he had in mind when he made that statement." Conveniently, he did not want to seek clarification from Heston. For obvious reason, Shaida Badiie decided not to share the minutes of the meeting with TAG members.

6. **TAG was kept in the Dark** - When ICP preliminary data was sent to TAG members, Heston shared his concerns candidly, stating that the data for China and India were “seriously misleading.” He focused on the two countries because they are the largest developing countries both in terms of population and economic sizes.

Heston wrote: "For those wanting to understand why China and India have gone down so much relative to the US, then they should look at the near 15% reduction for both countries. And since no [productivity] adjustment was carried out for any OECD or South American countries, it significantly affects comparisons between countries like Brazil, Mexico, Russia and Hungary with China or India."

The 15% reduction was attributed to productivity adjustments. The reductions in China’s and India’s economies were exacerbated by other factors as well. The total reduction is estimated to range from 30% to 50% by other TAG members.

Heston’s concerns echoed the same concerns that Biru had been raising internally. Biru was accused of being disruptive and his concerns were shrugged off as unfounded. After Heston expressed the same concern, Biru brought it to the attention of senior management.

But Dikhanov claimed “Alan wrote his note before we had a meeting with him explaining how the results were produced.” Fred Vogel (the ICP Global Manager) reinforced Dikhanov’s claim stating “Yuri’s comment below about Alan Heston is correct.” Read Vogel’s and Dikhanov’s emails [here](#). Their claims were contradicted in [Deaton and Heston \(2009\)](#) that reiterated Heston’s above quoted concerns.

Vogel’s and Dikhanov’s narrative was also rejected by the Chinese government that demanded an explanation about the data. The World Bank made sure that TAG members and World Bank Board of Directors were kept in the dark. Read Badiie’s memo [here](#). In the memo, she referred to TAG members as people “outside of the World Bank” and to the Bank’s Board of Directors (representing member countries) as “our clients in the World Bank.”

7. **There was overwhelming evidence that the ICP data was manipulated.** The ICP global report was the first World Bank publication that did not contain transparent methodological notes. Martin Ravallion (World Bank’s Director of Research) wrote to Fred Vogel (ICP Global Manager) stating: “Fred, what is the best single source you can send me summarizing the ICP methodology? I could not find much (anything?) on the ICP Global report, and I am sure I am not the only one asking...” Vogel was in no way ready to disclose the “methodology.”

Ravallion contacted Biru stating: Yonas, you are the only one I can rely on. I will take full responsibility, but please can you shade light on the data.¹ Biru told him that parts of the data were fabricated. That did not stop Ravallion from embracing the data and shouting aloud from the top of the Bank’s Ivory Tower: “The Developing World Is Poorer Than We Thought.”

¹ Biru does not have this email. He is paraphrasing the content, which he said he distinctly remembers. He challenges the World Bank to provide him access to Lotus Notes, if either Ravallion or the Bank contest the veracity of his claim. Biru has the encrypted files on CD. All he needs is access to the Bank’s email system to be able to retrieve from the CD.

II. DIKHANOV'S DATA MANIPULATION WAS AN OPEN SECREET

- 8. The data manipulation problem came to the surface after Biru took over the management of ICP upon Vogel's retirement.** However, for PR purposes Vogel was fronted as the official Global Manager to the outside world.

A confidential memo marked "Yonas will not get a copy or see it" authored by the Chair of the ICP Executive Board (Dennis Trewin) exposed a confidential agreement between the World Bank and the ICP Board to keep Fred as Global Manager, even though World Bank staff rules did not allow a consultant to perform managerial duties.

Trewin wrote: "I understand it is not possible even on an informal basis to designate a consultant as global manager... Rob Edwards (IMF), Enrico Giovanini (OECD) and Pieter Everaers (EU) think Yonas has become Global Manager. I have advised them that this is not the case..."

The explanation give to Biru by the World Bank was that "Europeans are not used to seeing a black man in a position of power." Badiie admitted on the record that "the day to day coordination of the ICP work and the team was basically taken over by Yonas... He took charge of the ICP work at its most critical time." However, at international meetings Vogel posed as Global Manager and presented Biru's work as his own.

A Senior HR Officer (Eric Schlesinger) sent Biru a memo advising him not to disclose to the ICP external Board that he was the one running the program.

During the Appeals Committee hearing, Badiie was asked to explain "In what context is Eric giving this advice to [Biru]." She stated: "That was in the context of Yonas [who] wanted to make sure that the Board is really aware of his division of labor vis-à-vis Fred Vogel. And I think in that context of, you know, explaining more of his responsibilities and the contributions that he has made. And I think it was in that context Eric Schlesinger if I recall, advising him to, you know, not to send too many, you know, communications or e-mails of that nature to the Executive Board..." ([Appeals Transcript Pages 327-8](#)).

- 9. The data manipulation was facilitated by breaking all World Bank rules - using the allegedly "embarrassing data" the African Development Bank submitted as an excuse.** It began with (1) moving the ICP data from the Bank's official server to the "personal laptop" of Yuri Dikhanov, (2) using Dikhanov's data manipulation software instead of the official ICP software, and (c) putting a lock on Dikhanov's office door.² Dikhanov was the only economist in DEC vice presidential unit of nearly 200 economists with a bolt on his door.
- 10. Why Change the Software?** The ICP Official Tool Pack (software) was designed to discourage data manipulation. It registers when data is changed, where it was changed, and who changed it. Dikhanov used his own system and refused to provide Biru or the department's IT unit access to it. Only Nada

² Before Dikhanov developed the ICP data processing software, he developed a fancy system to produce global income inequality. Martin Ravallion's team tested the system and found serious problem with it. The system was discarded. No one has tested the ICP software and no one knows if it produces simple arithmetic averages.

Hamadeh (then Dikhanov's research assistant and currently his boss) and Vogel had the software installed on their laptops. The trio were responsible for the fabricated data.

During the litigation Process, Dikhanov was asked why he denied Biru access to his software when he was his supervisor? He responded on the record stating: "The data are confidential and the software contains confidential data" (See Appeals Transcript, P 266). During the same proceedings, the Peer Review Panel asked Misha Belkindas (a senior manager in the department) if he was "concerned" by Dikhanov's action to deny Biru access to the data production software? Belkindas responded: "No." (Appeals Transcript, P 143)

As per the ICP Policy Number 2, the data was supposed to be restored on the department's "M Drive" and Biru was supposed to have unfettered access to it. This is confirmed in Badiee's memo: "Yonas is right that we need to put the [data] on the M drive. This is specified in the ICP policy paper 2." But she failed to instruct Dikhanov to put the data back on the M Drive. Instead, she suggested to discuss the matter at the ICP Meeting. Read her memo [here](#).

11. **The African Development Bank: an accomplice or unsuspecting victim** - A week later, at the ICP meeting, Badiee claimed that Africa's data is so bad that the African Development Bank (AfDB) does not want it to be on the World Bank's machines and that she needed to talk to them and get their permission. A month later, Biru brought up the matter again and requested her assistance to have Dikhanov put the data back on the Bank's institutional drive, as dictated in the ICP policy paper.

She wrote back stating: "As I mentioned to you at the last ICP Team meeting, I agree that we need to stick with the ICP policy statements, but we should also respect and consult with the regions. Africa is a special case as they are being extra cautious to avoid any data embarrassment for AfDB so let us not push them too much and discuss it with them at the upcoming regional coordinators meeting."

Once again after the regional coordinators meeting Biru followed up with Badiee. She wrote back stating: "During the Lisbon meetings, I did raise it with Michele and Charles [AfDB officials] last week and they sounded worried and cautious so we need to still be careful, but they will respect the policy."

This was a false pretext to give Dikhanov and company a cover while they fabricated the data. The data was never put back on the Bank's official server.

Biru reported the matter to then Senior VP and Chief Economist (Francois Bourguignon), Acting HR VP (Aulikki Kuusela) and the Bank's Ombudsman (Thomas Zgambo).

Belkindas sent Biru a memo stating: "I am concerned that your recent email to Bourguignon and Kuusela raises sensitive issues concerning our ICP partners which, as you know, require very careful management and should not have been raised in this forum" (click [here](#)). The Bank's Yurkish HR vice president and Chinese Sr, VP and Chief Economist would later use this to terminate Biru.

12. **A crime was committed against the poor in Africa and the IMF was blamed for it** - The ICP data was manipulated in two ways. The first was when the official regional economic estimates were used to compile the global database by Dikhanov with help from Hamadeh and Vogel. The way the global estimates were prepared resulted in a significant reduction of the economic levels of developing

countries. This is the issue that triggered widespread criticism from members of the ICP Technical Advisory Group (TAG) and other experts.

The most blatant and reckless act of data manipulation was done outside of TAG's radar screen. Dikhanov and company took it upon themselves to fabricate data for Africa. TAG members had no idea what was done. They assumed, as they should, the data was legitimate.

There were lots of gaps in the African data that needed to be filled using proxies or statistical imputation methods. As per the ICP policy, for other regions data gaps were filled either by national statisticians at the country level or by regional organizations, in close consultation with national statisticians.

The African Development Bank did what it could and sent the official regional data to the World Bank. In some areas, African countries did not have data for large sections of their respective economies such as government expenditure and gross capital formation. Such was the case for 17 African countries. This reflected lack of statistical capacity in African countries.

The ICP policy in such cases was to produce data for household expenditures and leave the rest blank. Vogel claimed that the Bank filled the gap for Africa at the request of IMF. He wrote: "The IMF requested that we provide them PPPs for the GDP for all countries. Therefore, it was decided to impute for the missing pieces in order to aggregate to the full GDP."

Dikhanov and company not only filled gaps, but also decided to drop data provided by four national statistical agencies and replaced them with their own estimates (read [here](#)). The IMF had no authority to ask the World Bank to fabricate data for Africa in violation of ICP's established policy. The truth is that IMF was used as an excuse. It had nothing to do with the data fabrication.

The impacts of the Bank's gap filling exercises were not random. They were systemic. Poor countries were affected more than their relatively richer neighbors. It was a deliberate and systemic act to make African countries look poorer than they were. The outcome was 100 million more poor were dumped in extreme poverty.

The crime is that the data was accepted by the African governments and African regional institutions as legitimate and used to form policy and monitor progress.

[The African Development Bank \(AfDB\) believes](#), "Infrastructure development is a key driver for progress across the African continent and a critical enabler for productivity and sustainable economic growth. It contributes significantly to human development, poverty reduction, and the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Investment in infrastructure accounts for over half of the recent improvement in economic growth in Africa and has the potential to achieve even more."

AfDB did not know the ICP data for construction for 21 African countries should have been footnoted with three asterisks to show they are unfit for research or policy. Before his termination, Biru was sent a memo instructing him not to communicate with AfDB or anyone else about the African data and could not inform AfDB of the crime. After his termination, the Tribunal put a gag order on him. The gag order is noted in the Tribunal's hearing transcript.

III. THE ICP TECHNICAL ADVISORY GROUP: AN UNSUSPECTING PR TOOL

13. **The World Bank used the Technical Advisory Group (TAG) like a drunkard uses a lamp post – for support rather than illumination.** From the beginning the World Bank and the ICP Board tried to limit TAG’s membership to institutional experts from the IMF, EU, OECD, World Bank, etc. Vogel and the Interim Chair of the ICP Board and Director of Statistics at the IMF (Rob Edwards) insisted that Professors such as Alan Heston, Erwin Diewert, Prasada Rao, etc should not be included. As a consolation Edwards ultimately agreed to consider only Diewert. Read [here](#).

Biru argued for a fully independent TAG, including the above noted scholars. He prevailed after the then Chief Economist Nick Stern agreed with him.

After TAG was established, there was a systemic effort to undermine its role. Its Chair, Professor Alan Heston made this evident, noting that the World Bank failed to organize a meeting for TAG for nearly two years while ICP data was being surveyed and compiled. He underlined his concern writing about the existence of a “significant gap in communication” between TAG and the ICP Global Office.

Speaking of a planned TAG meeting to discuss several outstanding technical issues, Heston wrote: “My concern, which I have shared with the Global Office, is that there be adequate documentation available for the TAG in advance of the meeting in September so that we can deal with these questions and make an informed recommendation on such issues and the overall results.” Read Heston’s note [here](#). No documentation was provided to TAG.

Ultimately, the data was published without sufficient input from or endorsement of TAG. Nonetheless, [the Global Report](#) stated: “The Technical Advisory Group (TAG) was responsible for providing advice on technical issues related to the ICP. The TAG’s responsibilities were to resolve conceptual and methodological matters.”

14. **After the data was published World Bank staff members from the field offices started reaching out to TAG members for answer.** Deaton wrote an email to ICP Managers and TAG members stating: “I am getting emails of distress from Bank staffers in Delhi, who do not understand what is going on or how to handle these numbers.”

Deaton added: “Of course, I have no idea what Yuri actually did. When I started doing this, I had hoped to reproduce the ICP numbers, but it became clear for many reasons that that is not possible. So, I do not know whether what Yuri did is invariant or not. I would be happy to share my STATA code if anyone is interested. Alan and I plan to make all of this a good deal clearer in the next version of our paper.”

Another high-profile TAG member, Professor Erwin Diewert, tried to get information from Dikhanov, without success. Diewert wrote to Biru stating: “Yonas, I have been looking over the materials on the World Bank ICP website and I cannot find a technical document that explains exactly how the [ICP data] were aggregated. Is there a technical document out there somewhere that you could direct me to or send to me?”

Biru was of no help because he was under a strict gag order, after he reported data manipulation to the World Bank Chief Ethics Officer and to two Chief Economists, Francois Bourguignon and Justin Lin.

[Prasada Rao](#) (a Tag member) and three other experts co-authored an article titled “Who Shrunk China.” They found that “the World Bank’s estimate is too low by as much as 30%.” A current member of TAG, [Robert Feenstra](#) of the University of California at Davis concluded that “real GDP in China relative to the United States is quite plausibly 50% higher than estimated by the World Bank.”

The Bank lost all credibility. Subsequently, it was forced to establish an independent [Data Computation Taskforce](#) to ensure future data are replicable and the credibility of the resulting data is vetted by external experts before they are published. In the meantime, Dikhanov and Hamadeh were promoted and Vogel was given lucrative consultancy assignments and elevated to be co-chair of TAG.

IV. INSTITUTIONAL RESISTENCE TO ACCEPT THE TRUTH

15. [Chandy and Kharas](#) (2014) used the new ICP data that was computed by the independent Data Taskforce and found the number of people living in extreme poverty to be 571 million for the year 2010. The World Bank’s estimate for the same year that used the ICP data produced by the World Bank was 1.2 billion.

[Deaton and Aten](#) (2014) believe the new ICP data are “superior” to the ICP data produced by the World Bank. They highlighted: “The world according to [the new data] looks markedly more equal” than that calculated from ICP data produced by the World Bank. This did not sit well with the World Bank’s”.

After the latest ICP data was released in 2014, [the World Bank published a report](#) that stated “Adapting the [new] data without any revisions or adjustments would result in a significant decline in the overall level of poverty. At this point in time, there are still several questions raised in the initial analysis of these data that require answers prior to determining the appropriate application of the [new] data for the poverty estimates.”

Twelve World Bank experts including Dikhanov, Hamadeh, a Deputy Chief Economist of the World Bank, the Regional Chief Economist for Africa, three Lead Economists from the Bank’s Poverty and Equity Global Practice, and two Lead Economist from the Bank’s Research Department, among others published a Policy Research Working Paper that considered not to adopt the new data (read [here](#)).

Let us put the substance of the Working Paper aside and take note of the fact that this is the first World Bank Working Paper to sport 12 authors on its cover page, running the gamut from Dikhanov and Hamadeh, to the Bank’s polished researchers, to its decorated chief economists and respected policy makers. It was intended to exude a sense of broad consensus in the World Bank. It was a poorly thought-out and amateurishly staged political theater. And a PR dud, one may add!

For a year-and-a-half the World Bank continued to use the old ICP data, while it was negotiating with the US and European governments about the replenishment of a three-year funding cycle. Ultimately, it adopted the new data after the conclusion of the negotiation and because of a strong push from TAG members and other scholars.

After it reluctantly adopted the new ICP data, it changed the \$1.25 a day global poverty line to \$1.90. In a revealing piece titled, “Earth’s poor set to swell as World Bank moves poverty line”, the [Financial](#)

[Times](#) noted that this is “a move likely to swell the statistical ranks of the world’s poor by tens of millions.”

The Financial Times quoted Professor Heston as saying: “The World Bank’s administering of the poverty line also carried a hint of conflict of interest, as the bank’s main task was fighting poverty, and its very existence depended on its own poverty measures.” Mr. Deaton added: “I think they have some institutional bias towards finding more poverty rather than less.”

V. WHISTLE BLOWING, INSTITUTIONAL LIES AND A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE

16. **The Bank’s retaliation against Biru was swift and harsh.** In October 2016, *Senator Chris Van Hollen wrote a letter* to the US Departments of State and Treasury, stating the World Bank “retroactively downgraded Dr. Biru’s performance record” of seven years.

The Senator provided hard evidence that the World Bank went as far as deleting Biru’s Deputy Global Manager and Team Leader titles from its website and falsely claiming under oath and on record that “he had no management responsibility. To be sure, he has been asked to help during spikes in work assignments as a team member.”

17. **One of the World Bank lawyers refused to represent Badiee and her deputy (Misha Belkindas) before the World Bank Tribunal.** Biru’s case was first reviewed by the Bank’s Appeals Committee. Badiee and Belkindas were represented by one of the Bank’s institutional lawyers, Nancy Lindsay. When the case proceeded to the Tribunal, Lindsay (an American citizen) refused to take the case because of Badiee’s and Belkindas’ utter disregard for the truth.

The Bank appointed a Nigerian lawyer, Chukwuemeke Okeke. Together with Okeke, Badiee and Belkindas took the term perjury to new heights.

18. **The World Bank Filed a Fake ICP Executive Board list with the Tribunal.** The World Bank tried to hide behind the Tribunal, falsely claiming the Tribunal found Biru lacking of international credibility. The Tribunal asked the Bank to submit a list containing the names and contact details of members of the Executive Board. The Bank claimed it takes time to compile the list and requested for an extension of the deadline. The Bank took the extra time to compile a fake list, adding false names.

One of the fake people who posed as a Principal ICP Board member was Michel Mouyelo-Katoula, who was promised the ICP Global Manager position if he agreed to pose as a “Principal ICP Board member” and helped the Bank to discredit Biru. At the time, Mouyelo-Katoula was the coordinator for ICP-Africa at the African Development Bank. ICP rules did not allow regional ICP coordinators to be Board members. He was never a Board member. Nonetheless, he posed as a “Principal Board member” and supported the Bank’s defamatory attacks on Biru. He was awarded the Global Manager position.

Another person whose name the World Bank submitted to the Tribunal as a Principal ICP Board members was Louis Marc Ducharme. At the time, Ducharme was a senior Canadian government official.

Ducharme is on the record stating that he was never a member of the ICP Board and was not aware that the Bank was using his name as one. Read [here](#). The legitimate Principal Board member

representing Canada was Jacob Ryten. The Bank unilaterally downgraded Ryten as alternate Board member, after he raised concern about the breach of data production protocol.

In addition, the Chief Economist for the Asian Development Bank (ADB), Ifzal Ali, is on the record stating that the person whose name the World Bank submitted to the Tribunal as the representative of ADB was not authorized to represent ADB. Ifzal wrote: "I was the sole ADB representative in the ICP Executive Board. There is no ambiguity on this."

19. **The World Bank "Retroactively Downgraded Biru's Performance Record" of Eight Years.** US Senator Chris Van Hollen's 73-page report (2016) provided hard evidence that the World Bank went as far as deleting Biru's title from its website and falsely claiming under the oath of law that "he had no management responsibility." In the Bank's publications, Biru was presented as one of the 31 people who were involved in ICP data production, rather than as the manager of the team.

By retroactively degrading his record and defaming him as lacking of international credibility, the World Bank tried to mitigate the impact of his criticism of data manipulation. It also used the degraded data to justify its claim that he lacked management experience to be officially named Global Manager. This was used as an *ex post facto* explanation why Vogel was fronted as a ghost Global Manager.

20. **The Tribunal ruled fronting Vogel as Global Manager without his managing anything and keeping Biru behind the scenes was "prudent."** The first question one of the Tribunal judges asked Biru was "What was it being designated Global Manager that is so magical to have led you to this stage where you think it was a loss to the rest of the world?" Biru's lawyer interjected politely – "May I ask a clarifying question?" The judge shut her up: "Asking me? No. You can't ask me questions, obviously. That's not permitted."

The final judgement was: "The Tribunal does not find anything unusual or unreasonable in the decision of the ICP Executive Board and the Bank that it would be prudent to have Mr. X continue to serve as the Global Manager," even though it was established by three World Bank officials that he was not serving as Global Manager. He was impersonating as one for nearly two years.

An independent report by the Government Accountability Project (GAP) documented the following: "After the Global Manager (Mr. Vogel) retired, but was retained as a short-term consultant. Contrary to normal Bank practice whereby consultants play a support role, Mr. Vogel was allowed to keep his title as Global Manager. However, since Bank rules would not allow him to perform managerial duties, Mr. Biru managed the day-to-day coordination of the program, supervised staff and administered the ICP trust fund. There was no business reason to maintain Mr. Vogel as Global Manager when he was not managing anything. Mr. Biru established this with numerous supporting documents. However, the Tribunal paid no attention to any of the documents, nor to the testimonies of Bank officials who established at the Appeals hearing that as a consultant, Mr. Vogel was not allowed to manage fund or staff." Read full report [here](#).

21. **The Tribunal justified keeping the data on Dikhanov's personal laptop, bolting it in his office and denying his supervisor (Biru) access to it.** The judgment that referred to Dikhanov as "Mr. R," and Belkindas as "Manager of DECDG" read: "The Tribunal finds the explanations provided by Mr. R and the Manager of DECDG reasonable." Dikhanov's explanation was "The data are confidential and the software contains confidential data" Belkindas' answer was he was "not concerned" by it.

22. **The Tribunal's Official and Confidential Judgements** - The Tribunal summarily dismissed Biru's claims of racial discrimination and retaliation, ruling (1) everything the Bank did was "justified by business rationales," and (2) Biru failed to present "convincing reasons why the Tribunal should disregard the testimony of [Belkindas and Badiee.]"

The Tribunal judgement was inexplicable. It willfully suppressed material evidence to subvert the course of justice. Biru presented four sets of evidence (hundreds of pages), documenting the Bank's perjury, but the Tribunal suppressed it.

The first set of evidence showed specific examples that Biru was disenfranchised of his accomplishments and the credit for his work was given to others (see [here](#)). The second set of evidence provided samples of testimonials from 24 World Bank and international officials exposing the Bank's perjury (see [here](#)). The third set showed Biru's official performance record and the perjured record that is currently on the Bank's website (see [here](#)). The fourth set provided physical evidence of perjured documents (see [here](#)).

The fact that the Tribunal willfully suppressed the evidence is exposed by a confidential Tribunal memo that Biru was copied by mistake. In the memo, the Tribunal listed three pages of items why it believed Badiee was "dishonest" (Click [here](#)).

23. **The Bank's Admission of Perjury** - Since 2010, Biru has been fighting to have the irreparably defamatory record removed from the Bank's website so he can seek employment elsewhere to support his family.

As *Senator Van Hollen's* documented, "Ultimately, [in 2014] the World Bank internally restored Biru's original and correct record." The HR sent him a note stating the redacted part of his management accomplishments "will be scanned into your staff record." However, the Bank refused to withdraw the perjured record from its website, claiming his officially restored internal record is "too good to be true"

An opinion piece in [The Hill](#) independently confirmed that the World Bank "disenfranchised Biru of his professional credentials," claiming it was "too good to be true for a black man." See [here](#) a table comparing Biru's official record with his perjured record that is currently on the Bank's website.

The evidence provided on the Table has been verified among others by the US government, the Government Accountability Project (GAP), the DC Civil Rights Coalition, US Senators Barbara Mikulski and Chris Van Hollen and the US Congressional Black Caucus.

24. **The Tribunal Reopened Biru's Case in 2014 and 2015** - Biru filed two appeals with the World Bank Tribunal. First, he argued that the Bank's decision to restore his management record internally proves that Badiee's sworn testimony during the Tribunal proceedings that "he had no management responsibility" was a criminal perjury. Second, "there are no grounds for the World Bank to maintain the defamatory remarks on its website after it corrected the record internally."

The Tribunal accepted Biru's appeal and asked the World Bank to respond. This gave President Kim an opportunity to settle the case. The appeal coincided with the Bank's diversity report that found Biru's story as a "blatant and virulent case of racism."

The Bank's Senior Advisor for Racial Equality filed an *amicus brief* with the Tribunal stating the injustice is "profoundly beyond the pale" and thanking the Tribunal's decision to reopen the case.

25. **The World Bank's legal defense that the Tribunal was aware of Badiee's and Belkindas' perjury, therefore it has no legal power to reopen the case.** The World Bank filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. The General Counsel responded to Dr. Biru's allegations of perjury stating: "These were facts known to the Tribunal when the two judgments [discrimination/retaliation and termination] were delivered."

The Bank made its case providing concrete evidence that the Tribunal had before it a document titled "Serial Perjury by the World Bank and its Institutional Witnesses." It knew the Bank's evidence was perjured. Thus, the General Counsel argued, the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to reopen what it has willfully ruled as legal and by the Tribunal Statute its judgments are final, binding and without appeal. Therefore, it has no jurisdiction to reopen the case.

The Tribunal conceded the jurisdictional challenge and backed off from reviewing the merits of the appeals. In his letter, Senator Van Hollen expressed dismay stating: "This was despite the fact that the original judgment was based on what is now known to be false testimony."

There was one hurdle to the Bank's legal defense. Staff Rule 2.01 obliges the World Bank to correct defamatory public record to mitigate reputational harm. As reported in several American and African newspapers, the World Bank's position is that it will not honor the Staff Rule in Biru's case because his restored internal record is "too good to be true for a black man."

26. **What is Biru's Outstanding Case?** The World Bank falsely claims that Biru is trying to overturn the Tribunal's judgments. Biru's outstanding issues as explicitly outlined in Senator Van Hollen's Report are three: "[1] The World Bank restore Biru's name and leadership titles to its publications and websites;" [2] withdraw the untrue and defamatory records of him from its website, and [3] remedy the situation."

The issue is succinctly presented by Armstrong Williams in [The Hill](#). "Currently, the bank's VP of human resources and its general counsel (a senior VP) maintain contradictory positions on Biru's official record. The bank's HR executive affirms Biru's stellar management record as official and valid. In contrast, the general counsel insists that Biru's record is "hagiographic" – too good to be true – and the World Bank will not use the actual record of his performance to correct the retrospectively degraded record on its website. To date, the president of the bank has sided with the general counsel."

World Bank Staff Rule 2.01 requires the Bank to correct "false and misleading" information. The buck stops with the President to redress the injustice through administrative channel or comply with the US law and resolve the case through external arbitration.